
Cryptography is hard: Breaking the DoNex ransomware



whoami

- Malware reverse engineer
- CTI analyst
- Specializes in ransomware
- Finding & exploiting weaknesses to build decryptors





vx-underground


Your chances of being a victim of ransomware increases over 250% if your organization owns a computer.

Do not use computers.

[Reposted, apparently people didn't get the joke]







Donex ransomeware leakage

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mirel

Nous sommes votre partenaire en matière de recrutement et de sélection. Nous nous déplaçons sans en gagement en entreprise afin de {...}

2024.02.27

CHOCOTOPIA

Chocotopia is a center of entertainment in the heart of Prague. You can visit here Museum of Chocola and experience Chocolate { ... }

2024.02.27

elsapspa

Da oltre 50 anni, Elsap è un'impresa dedita alla rappresentanza e alla distribuzione di componenti ele onici ed elettromeccanici { ... }

2024.02.24

Donex ransomeware leakage

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CHOCOTOPIA

2024-02-27

Chocotopia is a center of entertainment in the heart of Prague.


You can visit here Museum of Chocolate and experience Chocolate workshops, Wax museum of legends by Grévin, Candy shop, and our Snack @ dessert bar.

Currently, our new Chocotopia Experience center is open and looking forward for visitors, who are looking for unique adventure.


Website: www.chocotopia.cz

Total leaked:33GB

How the cyber criminal plans it




How we plan it



Building a decryptor

- Implements inverse logic of ransomware
- Based on
 - Cryptographic weakness
 - Leaked decryption keys



Distributing decryptors

Upload encrypted files here (size cannot be larger than 1 MB)



Choose first file from PC



Choose second file from

Type below any email, website URL, onion or/and bitcoin address you see in the RANSOM DEMAND. Note: Be especially accurate with the spelling.

Or <u>upload</u> the file (.txt or .html) with the ransom note left by criminals

Go! Find out






The general advice is not to pay the ransom. By sending your money to cybercriminals you'll only confirm that ransomware works, and there's no guarantee you'll get the decryption key you need in return.





Powered by:






And now... DoNeX

```
if ( CreateMutexA(0, 1, "CheckMutex") && GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS )
{
    _loaddll(0);
    JUMPOUT(0x403338);
}
for ( i = 0; i < 0x21C0; i += 64 )
{
    *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i] = _mm_xor_si128((__m128i)xor_key_vector, *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i]);
    *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 16] = _mm_xor_si128((__m128i)xor_key_vector, *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 16]);
    *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 32] = _mm_xor_si128(*(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 32], (__m128i)xor_key_vector);
    *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 48] = _mm_xor_si128((__m128i)xor_key_vector, *(__m128i *)&xml_config[i + 48]);
}
for ( ; i < 0x21E7; ++i )
    xml_config[i] ^= 0xA9u;
config_ptr = maybe_parse_xml(0, (char)xml_config, (int)returns_2);</pre>
```

Execute script



The configuration

- Ransom note
- Whitelisted files / directories
- Victim-specific options


```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<root>
       <white_extens>386;adv;ani;bat;bin;cab;cmd;com;cpl;cur
       <white_files>bootmgr;autorun.inf;boot.ini;bootfont.bi
        <white_folders>$recycle.bin;config.msi;$windows.~bt;$v
        <kill_keep>sql;oracle;mysq;chrome;veeam;firefox;excel
        <services>vss;sql;svc$;memtas;mepocs;msexchange;sophos
        <black_db>ldf;mdf</black_db>
        <encryption_thread>30</encryption_thread>
       <walk_thread>15</walk_thread>
        <local_disks>true</local_disks>
        <network_shares>true</network_shares>
        <kill_processes>true</kill_processes>
        <kill_services>true</kill_services>
        <shutdown_system>true</shutdown_system>
        <delete_eventlogs>true</delete_eventlogs>
        <cmd>wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive</cmd>
       <cmd>vssadmin Delete Shadows /All /Quiet</cmd>
       <content>
                            !!! DoNex ransomware warning !!!
>>>> Your data are stolen and encrypted
```

The Cryptography: key generation

```
random_encryption_key = generates_secure_random_key((HCRYPIPROV)@savedrogs_ 16);
pointer_to_footer = rsa_encrypts_buffer(random_encryption_key, 16u);
```

```
params[1] = hCryptProv;
params[2] = retaddr;
if (CryptAcquireContextA(params, 0, 0, 1u, 0)
    GetLastError() != -2146893802
     (result = (char *)CryptAcquireContextA(params, 0, 0, 1u, 8u)) != 0 )
  pobuffer = (PBYTE)malloc(random len);
  memset(pbBuffer, 0, random_len);
  if ( CryptGenRandom(params[0], random_len, pbBuffer) )
    if ( random_len > 0 )
      if ( (unsigned int)random_len >= 8 && unk_439E74 >= 2 )
        v5 = mm_cvtsi32_si128(6u);
        v6 = _mm_cvtsi32_si128(0x1Fu);
        do
          v7 = _mm_cvtepu8_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(*(_DWORD *)&pbBuffer[v4]));
          v8 = _mm_sra_epi32(
                 _mm_add_epi32(
                    (<u>m128i</u>)_mm_shuffle_ps(
                               __m128)_mm_mul_epi32(_mm_unpacklo_epi32(v7, v7), (__m128i)xmmword_4293F0);
                                __m128)_mm_mul_epi32(_mm_unpackhi_epi32(v7, v7), (__m128i)xmmword_4293F0),
```

Following the trail



The encryption function

```
__int64 *nonce_ptr,
      unsigned int a4,
      PBYTE buffer,
      int buffer_length)
void *key_schedule_proc; // edx
PBYTE v7; // eax
unsigned int v8; // ebx
int v9; // edi
BYTE *v10; // eax
int v11: // esi
BYTE *v12; // ecx
char keystream[64]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-50h] BYREF
int64 nonce int64; // [esp+40h] [ebp-10h] BYREF
__int64 v16; // [esp+48h] [ebp-8h]
void *use 128 bita; // [esp+5Ch] [ebp+Ch]
PBYTE buffera; // [esp+68h] [ebp+18h]
key_schedule_proc = salsa20_schedule_32;
if ( use_128_bit )
 key schedule proc = 0;
v16 = 0LL:
if ( use_128_bit == 1 )
 key schedule proc = salsa20 schedule 16;
use 128 bita = key schedule proc;
if ( !key_schedule_proc )
 return 1:
if (!encryption key)
  return 1;
if (!nonce_ptr)
 return 1:
v7 = buffer:
if (!buffer)
 return 1;
v8 = a4;
nonce_int64 = *nonce_ptr;
if ((a4 \& 0x3F) != 0)
  LOBYTE(v16) = a4 >> 6:
  BYTE1(v16) = a4 >> 14;
  BYTE2(v16) = a4 >> 22;
  BYTE3(v16) = a4 >> 30;
  ((void (__cdecl *)(PBYTE, __
                               nt64 *, char *))key_schedule_proc)(encryption_key, &nonce_int64, ]
  v7 = buffer;
```

```
unsigned int __cdecl salsa20_schedule_32(int a1, int a2, int a3)
 int v3; // esi
 int v4; // edi
 unsigned int v5; // kr00 4
 int v6; // ecx
 int v8; // edx
 int v9: // edi
 char v10; // al
 int v11; // esi
 int v12; // edx
 int v13; // ecx
 int v14; // eax
 int v15; // edx
 int v16: // edx
 unsigned int v17; // ecx
 unsigned int result; // eax
 int v19[16]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-90h]
 int v20[16]; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-50h] BYREF
 int state[4]; // [sep:30] [sha-10h] BYREF
 qmemcpy(state, "expand 32-byte k", size f(state));
 v3 = a3 + ...
unsigned int __cdecl salsa20 schedule 16(char *a1, int a2, int a3)
  int v3; // esi
  int v4; // edi
 unsigned int v5; // kr00 4
  _BYTE *v6; // edx
  char *v7; // ecx
  int v8; // esi
  char v9; // al
  int v10; // esi
  int v11; // edi
  int v12; // edx
  int v13; // ecx
  int v14; // eax
 int v15; // edx
  int v16; // edx
 unsigned int v17; // ecx
 unsigned int result; // eax
 int v19[16]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-90h]
 int v20[16]; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-50h] BYREF
  int v21[4]: // [ssp.cci.] [shp-10h] BYREF
  qmem oy(v21, "expand 16-byte k", siz of(v21));
```

Salsa20 or ChaCha20?

```
#include <stdint.h>
#define ROTL(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
#define QR(a, b, 0, d)(
    b ^= ROTL(a + d, 7),
    c ^= ROTL(b + a, 9),
    d ^= ROTL(c + b, 13),
    a ^= ROTL(d + c, 18))
#define ROUNDS 20
```

The constant is the same as Salsa20 ("expand 32-byte k"). ChaCha replaces the Salsa20 quarter-round QR(a, b, c, d) with:

```
a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16;
c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12;
a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8;
c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7;
```


```
nt __cdecl salsa20_key_expansion(_DWORD *a1)
int result; // eax
a1[4] ^= _ROL4_(*a1 + a1[12], 7);
     ^{=} ROL4 (a1[4] + *:1.9):
       ^= ROL4 (a1[10] + a1[6],
      ^= ROL4 (a1[15] + a1[11], 7);
a1[11] ^= __ROL4__(a1[7] + a1[3], 13);
result = __ROR4__(a1[11] + a1[7], 14);
a1[15] ^= result:
return result;
```

Key in global variable, nonce is zero...

```
xxd -1 128 checkz.xis. f58A66B51
00000000; ed97 e2de 5249 056 2236 5bb4 1791 37e9
                                                  ....RI.V"6[...7.
00000010. 8d43 7726 2542 2af d7a2 b50f 2797 d94c
                                                  .Cw&%B.....'..l
00000020: 3139 06bb b320 c832 fa4b 53ae 83c7 71a5
                                                  1.....2.KS...a.
                                                  .9.?...p..fi...]
00000030: 0339 a23f 078c 1570 bb9f 6669 db15 d25d
00000040: 2f65 d38c b8f2 7259 5de5 d23a 9d15 2b2b
                                                  /e....rY]..:..++
                                                  5.W... ..0}r{1~.
00000050: 35c8 578f 8fba 20e9 7f30 7d72 7b6c 7e97
00000060: ec93 af84 b557 9e46 1d05 19f6 7832 940a
                                                  .....W.F....x2..
00000070: 3674 70c0 4567 821f e8e8 ae17 a1d3 08d2
                                                  6tp.Eg......
```

```
xxd -1 128 cneck.xlsx.;58A66B51
00000000. ed97 e2de 5249 :056 2236 5bb4 1791 37e9 ...RI.V"6[...7.
00000010. 8d43 7726 2542 d2af d7a2 b50f 2797 d94c .Cw&%B.....'..L
00000020: 310: 96bb 15a0 c832 fa4b 53ae 83c7 71a5 1....2.KS...q.
00000030: 0339 a23f 078c 1570 bb9f 6669 db15 d25d .9.?..p..fi...]
00000040: 2f65 d38c b8f2 7259 5de5 d23a 9d15 2b2b /e...rY]..:.++
00000050: 35c8 578f 8fba 20e9 7f30 7d72 7b6c 7e97 5.W....0}r{1~.
00000060: ec93 af84 b557 9e46 1d05 19f6 7832 940a ....W.F...x2..
00000070: 3674 70c0 4567 821f e8e8 ae17 a1d3 08d2 6tp.Eg......
```

Stream ciphers & re-using key material



The XOR operation

A	В	A xor
		В
0	0	0
1	0	1
0	1	1
1	1	0

$$A \otimes B = C$$

$$A \otimes 0 = A$$

$$A \otimes A = 0$$

$$B \otimes C = A$$

Recovering the keystream

A = plaintext
C = ciphertext
K = keystream
$$A \otimes K = C$$

$$C \otimes A = K$$

In practice, it's not that easy

File Size	Encrypted
< 1MiB	Entire file
<10MiB	First 1MiB
<100MiB	5 blocks of 1MiB
>100MiB	100 blocks of 1MiB

```
if ( !lpFileName )
    return;
  salsa20 nonce = 0LL:
  number_of_blocks = 1;
  if ( file_size.HighPart > 0 )
    goto LABEL 10;
  if ( file size.QuadPart > 0x100000 )
    if ( file_size.HighPart < 0 || file_size.LowPart <= 0xA00000 )</pre>
      goto LABEL 11;
    if (file size.LowPart <= 0x6400000)
      number_of_blocks = 5;
LAPEL 11:
      read_block_size = 0x100000;
      goto LABEL_12;
LABEL 10:
    number of blocks = 100;
    goto LABEL 11;
  read_block_size = file_size.LowPart;
  if ( file_size.LowPart )
LABEL_12:
    lpBuffer = malloc(read_block_size);
    memset(lpBuffer, 0, read_block_size);
```

In practice, it's not that easy

```
FileW = CreateFileW(lpNewFileName, 0xC00000000, 0, 0, 0PEN_EXISTING, 0x80u, 0);// Open_file with GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE.
if ( FileW != (HANDLE)-1 )
  Size = 0:
  v16 = (unsigned __int64)(file_size.QuadPart / (unsigned int)number_of_blocks) >> 32;
  v22 = file_size.QuadPart / (unsigned int)number_of_blocks;
  do
    lpNewFileName = (LPCWSTR)((i * __PAIR64__(v16, v22)) >> 32);
    v18 = i * v22:
    SetFilePointer(FileW, i * v22, (PLONG)&lpNewFileName, 0);
   ReadFile(FileW, lpBuffer, read_block_size, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);
    salsa20_encrypt((int))random_encryption_key, 1, &v20, 0, (int)\left[pBuffer, read_block_s, ze);// State reinitialized every time
    SetFilePointer(FileW, v18, (PLONG)&lpNewFileName, 0);
    v19 = lpBuffer;
   WriteFile(FileW, lpBuffer, read_block_size, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);
    v16 = v21:
    i = Size + 1;
    Size = i:
  while ( i < number_of_blocks );
  SetFilePointerEx(FileW, file_size, 0, 0);
  WriteFile(FileW, pointer_to_footer, 0x200u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);// Writes footer, size = 512 bytes
  CloseHandle(FileW);
  writes_ransom_note(lpFileName);
  if ( v19 )
    j free base(v19);
```

Putting it all together

